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Introductory remarks  
Trade liberalization may be unilateral, bilateral, sub-regional or multilateral.  
The end of the cold war has witnessed an increasingly growing wave of     
unilateral trade liberalization accompanied by a regulatory framework that 
facilitates and enhances the momentum. Although the impact of unilateral 
trade liberalization undertaken in many countries including Ethiopia deserves 
discussion, the theme of this article has necessitated focus on multilateral 
trade liberalization under the WTO system. 
 
There has been much concern about the impact of Ethiopia’s prospective    
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the resultant        
commitment to the multilateral trade agreements (that constitute a single  
undertaking1).  The concern is whether Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO 
multilateral trade agreements would facilitate economic development.   
 
Ethiopia’s major drawback pertains to the production or supply side of goods 
and services and the resultant gap between our imports and exports.  Upon 
first impression, therefore, accession to WTO doesn’t seem to make sense 
because we haven’t yet been able to make use of our own local market and 
haven’t significantly made use of the preferential treatments accorded to our 
products under schemes such as AGOA2 (African  Growth and Opportunity 
Act)  and the EBA (Everything but Arms) Initiative.3           
*Dean, Faculty of Law, St. Mary’s Univer-
sity College  
1 According to Art. XII/1 of the WTO Agree-
ment, accession shall apply to the 1994 
Agreement Establishing the WTO and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed 
thereto, i.e Annex 1A- (Multilateral Agree-
ments on Trade in Goods;  Annex 1B- Gen-
eral Agreement on trade in Services; Annex 
1C- Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights and others. 
2 AGOA is an expansion of market access 
under the Generalized system of preferences 
(GSP) program so that imports into USA 
can be allowed duty-free from least devel-
oped countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
Generalized System of Preferences is one of 
the exceptions to the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) principle that requires WTO mem-
bers to extend the terms in favor of the 
‘most favored’ trading partner to imports 
from all other WTO members. 
3 The Everything But Arms Initiative is ap-
plied in EU countries to grant duty-free ac-
cess to imports from least developed coun-
tries (LDCs) (Continued ) 
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The immediate thought that captures one’s mind (in relation to goods) is thus 
the assumption that WTO Accession in the Ethiopian context might merely 
give freer ride to imports of foreign industrial and agricultural products.  
And, in the realms of services, critics consider liberalization of the service 
sector (pursuant to the General Agreement on Trade in Services -GATS) 
might be disadvantageous to Ethiopia under current realities, particularly in 
spheres such as banking, telecommunications and others. It is however to be 
noted that GATS does not oblige but merely encourages liberalization. More-
over, critics contend that the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) can adversely affect technology transfer to 
Ethiopia, an opportunity which nearly all developed economies had during 
the infancy of their industrial development.   
 
There is also an optimistic view which emphatically poses the question 
whether we are better off as a non-member of WTO.  According to this view, 
Ethiopia has one of the lowest import tariffs in the world 4, and WTO mem-
bership may not require bound tariffs lower than current rates.   Supporters of 
accession to WTO also forward long-term optimism in the realm of services 
and intellectual property rights despite inevitable difficulties in the short-run.  
Ethiopia’s integration with the international trading system, enhancement of 
credibility and guarantee against perceptions of high risk of policy reversals, 
review of various policies to make them conducive to foreign investment, 
guarantee to market access in contrast to the non-contractual schemes such as 
AGOA … are among the benefits forwarded in support of Ethiopia’s multi-
lateral trade liberalization under the WTO system. 
 
This article attempts to present an overview of these perspectives, and it 
highlights the contending lines of thought.  The first section presents back-
ground overview and the rationale of trade liberalization.  Section 2 briefly 
states some critical opinions on WTO accession of LDCs followed by the 
third and fourth sections that summarize views on the costs vis-à-vis benefits 
of accession to the WTO, the commitments of newly acceding countries and 
the issue of optimizing benefits.  Sections 5 and 6 discuss Ethiopia’s status in 
the accession process and lessons from the experience of Nepal, Cambodia 
and Vietnam whose accession to WTO has been recently finalized.   Section 
7 and the concluding remarks briefly discuss the path ahead and Ethiopia at 
3 …(cont.) without quantitative restrictions, 
except to arms and munitions. There are 
however, certain products (Sugar and rice) 
that have not  been granted the EBA duty-
free access until the expiry of the periods 
stated in the EBA (Everything But Arms) 
Regulation” (Regulation (EC) 416/2001). 
 
4  http:/ /stat .wto.org/CountryProfiles/
ET_e.htm 
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5 D.W Bowett, The Law of International In-
stitutions, 4th Edition (Univesal Law Pub-
lishing Co. Ltd, 2003.) at 1 
 
6 “As a result of the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence (1944) three main international institu-
tions were established which form the back-
bone of the current international economic 
legal system: the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the International Bank for  
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
better known under the name World Bank), 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which was replaced by the 
World Trade Orgainzation (WTO) in 1995” 
G.Loibl, ‘International Economic Law’ in 
Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 690 
 
7 “In addition to creating financial institu-
tions, there was also need to establish an 
international system to abolish trade barri-
ers.  Following the Second World War, a 
charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO) was drafted to deal with trade in 
goods.  (Continued ) 
crossroads.  These last sections attempt to identify factors that may contribute 
towards rendering multilateral trade liberalization ultimately beneficial.   
 




In ancient and medieval societies, trade was predominantly domestic, and 
only a few types of foreign products found their way into local markets.  It 
was under rare circumstances that the magnitude of commercial activities of 
foreign merchants needed a consul (as was known to Ancient Greeks and Ro-
mans) “to watch over the interests of the citizens of his State engaged in 
commerce in a foreign port.” 5 During the centuries following the renaissance 
and the industrial revolution, however, international trade has gradually en-
gulfed countries, cities, towns and villages despite the alternating prevalence 
of protectionism and free international trade depending on the interests and 
needs of states.         
 
Ever since countries have been engaged in international trade (of a signifi-
cant magnitude) they have been using tariffs and non-tariff measures to regu-
late the volume and types of imports in addition to the supplementary func-
tion of tariffs as sources of revenue.  Higher import tariffs apparently result 
in higher prices and thus reduce the demand for imported goods.  Moreover, 
tariffs are believed to protect infant local industries. 
 
This policy of protectionism has steadily encountered challenges by the com-
peting concept of free international trade. The doctrine of free international 
trade has also been subject of heated debate and controversy.  That was why 
the negotiations that started at the Bretton Woods (1944)6 failed to establish 
the International Trade Organization (ITO)7 that was meant to be the         
institutional framework of GATT 1947.   
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The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s marked a breakthrough to the 
triumph of the doctrine of free multilateral trade as the mainstream mindset 
among academics and policy makers.  And it was an impetus to the Uruguay 
Round culminating in the Marrakesh Agreement (1994) that brought about 
the Establishment of the WTO (in 1995) and the corresponding implementa-
tion of the multilateral agreements annexed thereto.   
 
There is much debate regarding the inconsistency between the promises en-
shrined in the Marrakesh Agreement and the actual reality.  In spite of sus-
tained economic growth at the global level, the gap between developed and 
least developed economies is increasingly widening, and in effect, there is 
sharp criticism against the shortcomings of the multilateral trading system. 
However, there is a steadily increasing application for accession to the WTO.  
And, many academics who strongly criticize multilateral trade liberalization 
under the WTO system tend to suggest reforms, technical assistance, longer 
transition periods and preferential treatment to Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) rather than recommending abstention from the multilateral trading 
system. 
 
1.2- The Raison d’etre of Free Multilateral Rrade: An Overview 
 
According to the doctrine of free multilateral trade “nations achieve the most 
efficient economic balance when all nations mutually agree to liberalize trade 
consistently, removing prohibitions or restrictions such as regulatory quotas 
(and) self-imposed restrictions.”  The doctrine holds that a nation is “best 
served if it specializes in and exports what it produces most efficiently com-
pared to other producing nations. Similarly, the nation must import what it 
produces least efficiently.” 8  
 
Advocates of free international trade believe that policies and trade laws of 
countries ought to be reconcilable and free from trade barriers, and contend 
that all forms of barriers to trade “have a negative effect on exporters because 
they interfere with the normal supply and demand and make international 
trade more complicated.” Such barriers are believed to negatively impact im-
7 (cont.) This was adopted in Havana in 1948, 
but it failed to enter into force since the 
United States Congress did not approve it 
and other States did not want to establish a 
global trading system without the largest 
economy in the world. Instead, International 
trade after the Second World War was based 
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), a multilateral treaty that was 
designed to operate under the umbrella of 
the ITO. It entered into force on a provi-
sional basis in 1948 and stated in force until 
1995 and was known as GATT 1947.”  Ibid, 
700  
8 Aleah Borghard, Free Trade, Economic 
Rights, and Displaced Workers: It works if 
you work it, Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2006), pp. 165-167 
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porters and ultimate consumers owing to their interference with competitive 
sourcing thereby resulting in higher prices. “The global trend in recent years 
has been to eliminate as many trade barriers as possible.” And,  “....[I]n com-
parison, liberal trade policies (i.e.- policies that allow the unrestricted flow of 
goods and services regardless of particular policies) sharpen competition, 
motivate innovation, and breed success.”9 
 
The doctrine of free international trade has its roots from David Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage “which instructs countries to concentrate on 
creating the product(s) they produce most efficiently, and then to trade with 
each other to obtain the products they desire.” The theory of comparative   
advantage advises a country to “import certain products even though it could 
produce them more efficiently than the country of origin if the importing 
country has a comparatively greater advantage in producing some other     
specialty.” 10   
 
Mattew Tuchband illustrates the doctrine of comparative advantage:  
 
“Although Colombia has the materials and technology to produce automo-
biles, it may choose to specialize in coffee production and import automo-
biles from Japan; the United States, though rich in domestic oil fields, may 
specialize in producing wheat and import most of its oil from ... the Middle 
East”. The factors that determine include “differing conditions of produc-
tion (a coastal nation's fishing advantage, for example), the decreasing costs 
associated with economies of scale, and differences in ‘tastes,’ (that may) 
allow a country to increase its overall consumption (and welfare) by spe-
cializing in what it does best.”11  
 
2. Views against WTO accession of LDC’s 
 
2.1- Unilateral –versus– Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
 
The desirability of free trade in light of the basic needs of the public at large 
is self-evident because it avails goods and services at the lowest possible 
price and at optimal quality.  This aspect of free multilateral trade positively 
contributes to the welfare of consumers and enhances the purchasing power 
of every household’s disposable income. There is, however, difference in 
opinion regarding the impact of free trade in the economic development and 
overall balance of payments of developing countries in general, and least   
developed countries (LDCs) in particular.  
9 Ibid 
 
10 Matthew Tuchband, The Systematic Envi-
ronmental Externalities of Free Trade: A 
Call for Wiser Trade Decision-Making, 83 
Georgetown Law Journal 2099 (June 1995) 
2102 
11 Ibid, 2103 
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12 Supra  Endnote 8, FN 27 
13 Global Exchange, Top Reasons to Oppose the WTO,  
    http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/OpposeWTO.html 
The long-term advantage of free trade has gained acceptance by most       
academics and policy makers.  But there is the view that the WTO multilat-
eral trading system (that imposes a single undertaking as an inseparable 
package for industrial goods, agricultural products, services and intellectual 
property rights) doesn’t pay enough attention to problems and needs of     
vulnerable economies of least developed countries.  
 
As stated in the introduction, trade liberalization may be unilateral, bilateral, 
sub-regional or multilateral.  Most critics do not argue against unilateral,    
bilateral and sub-regional trade liberalization whenever the realities warrant 
so that least developed countries can go through a pace based on their own 
particular economic realities. However, they usually oppose untimely       
multilateral liberalization under the WTO system and instead recommend 
prudent unilateral liberalization which developing countries can monitor and 
manage.  And nowadays, the criticism has sharpened because newly acceding 
LDCs are facing wider commitments beyond what is embodied in the GATT, 
GATS and TRIPS, and are also entitled to lesser rights (with regard to basic 
issues such as  transition periods) as compared to countries who are founding 
WTO members. 
   
2.2- Bigger concerns beyond lower price benefits 
 
Opponents of the WTO multilateral trading system admit that there is reduc-
tion of price, but they strongly contend that the cost that it entails in least de-
veloped countries outweighs the advantages.  According to this view “we can 
buy our T-shirts for 25 cents less, so on average we are richer, but at what 
cost? The slight economic advantage in price is not enough, and (we need to 
focus on) the bigger concerns." 12  
 
According to Global Exchange, "WTO would like (us) to believe that creat-
ing a world of 'free trade' will promote global understanding and peace” 
while “on the contrary, the domination of international trade by rich countries 
for the benefit of their individual interests fuels anger and resentment that 
make us less safe."13 Global Exchange contends that "Free trade is not work-
ing for the majority of the world”, and that “inequality worsened both inter-
nationally and within countries” during the period of rapid growth in global 
trade and investment …”   Global Exchange substantiates its position by UN 
Development Program reports which state that “the richest 20 percent of the 
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14 Global Exchange, www.globalexchange.org/
campaigns/fairtrade  
15 Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Question of 
Justice: The WTO, Africa, and Countermea-
sures for breaches of International Trade 
Obligations, 38 John Marshall Law Review 
1153 (Summer 2005) 1157 
16   Ibid, 1160 
world's population consume 86 percent of the world's resources while the 
poorest 80 percent consume just 14 percent.”14 
 
2.3- “Equality” Among Unequals 
 
The preamble of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement (Establishing the World 
Trade Organization) emphatically declares WTO’s objective of  “raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily grow-
ing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the produc-
tion of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of 
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable devel-
opment”  The preamble further declares that “there is need for positive ef-
forts designed to ensure that developing countries and especially the least 
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” 
 
Nsongurua J. Udombana discusses the gap between the vision of WTO and 
the reality. 15 He contrasts the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement with 
the facts on the ground and recalls George Orwell’s satire with regard to 
those that are ‘more equal than the others’.   
 
“…WTO trade regime has not benefited … all parties because it        oper-
ates like the Animal Farm. In Orwell's classic, animals take over the run-
ning of a farm, and everything is wonderful for a while--until the pigs get 
out of hand and take most of the power for themselves, thinking that they 
are the best administrators of government. Power ultimately corrupts them, 
as it does humans, and they turn on their fellow animals, eliminating com-
petitors through propaganda and bloodshed. Though written to reveal the 
hypocrisy of communism, as practiced in the then Soviet Union, Animal 
Farm is surprisingly relevant to an understanding of contemporary interna-
tional trade relations. Although all animals are equal under the WTO re-
gime, based on the concept of sovereignty and equality of states, the prac-
tice of trade reveals that some animals--the industrial countries--are more 
equal than others. …” 16 
 
According to Udombana, “Africa has witnessed a near stagnation in the last 
three decades and continues to be vulnerable to globalization and trade liber-
alization for several reasons.”  The reasons “include key problems in the 
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17 Ibid, 1167 
 
18  Ibid, 1168 
 
19 Ibid, 1169 
 
20 Measure First, Then Cut, The Economist, 
Sept. 11, 2004, at 77 (reviewing a World 
Bank study showing that bad regulations are 
a huge brake on global growth). 
‘supply side’ issues of market access, such as Africa's low capacity to pro-
duce and trade competitively in commodities, manufactured goods, and ser-
vices.”  Udombana underlines that “The composition of Africa's exports has 
essentially remained unchanged, with over-dependence on primary produc-
tion and resource-based sectors ….” 17  
 
Udombana further discusses the marginalization of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and suggests drastic reforms of the WTO “to address current trade in-
justices” so that it can “refute the charge that globalization is another word 
for colonization”.  According to Udombana, “Some developing countries 
have benefited from the vast growth that the manufacturing sector has experi-
enced in the last two decades and where global levels of protection have re-
duced significantly.”  
 
Yet, he states that “Africa has benefited little because of its focus on agricul-
ture, where growth has been slower and where significant protection still re-
mains” in developed countries. “Prices of primary products hardly move up 
due to a variety of factors, including the fact that demands for such products 
do not usually correlate with increase in income.”  The article further dis-
cusses the “general decline in the share of agricultural products in global 
trade and, on the other hand, a permanent world oversupply of virtually eve-
rything that Africa could offer. There is very little extra room for absorption 
of African exports.” 18  
 
With regard to Africa’s role in its own marginalization through wrong-footed 
economic and regulatory policies and strategies, Udombana criticizes many 
African governments for having failed to address “the imperatives of      
globalization, which require utilizing imaginative policies and strategies    
necessary to compete favorably in a growing competitive international       
environment” and remove “numerous obstacles (and pointless regulations) 
that many governments place in the way of private investments.”19 According 
to the Economist (11 September 2004), "businesses in poor countries … have 
to struggle through twice as many bureaucratic procedures as their           
counterparts in rich countries." 20 Unless African countries rectify their     
contribution towards their own marginalization, they can’t benefit from their 
relatively less expensive labor, proximity of local markets, and the potential 
for foreign direct investment.   
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21 Ileana M. Porras, Constructing Interna-
tional Law in the East Indian Seas: Prop-
erty, Sovereignty , Commerce and  War in 
Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae  --The Law 
of Prize and Booty, or ‘On How to Distin-
guish Merchants from Pirates’,  31 Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law 741 (2006) 
803 
22 Rolf J. Langhammer and Mattias Lücke, 
WTO Negotiations and Accession Issues for 
Vulnerable Economies, Kiel Institute of 
World Economics, (July 2000) p. 2 
Hugo Grotius had remarked that “[a]s the seventeenth century unfolded, con-
flict between European merchants in the East Indies escalated.”21 At present, 
the conflict has evolved from crude conflict to competition among producers 
to ultimately win the demand at national and foreign markets. Thus, WTO 
accession seems to have retained some traits of such conflicts ‘with civility’ 
in the form of intense negotiations that target at optimum benefits with mini-
mum concessions. True, the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement had 
promised to “ensure that developing countries and especially the least devel-
oped among them” deserve a share in the growth of international trade 
“commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”  In view of 
the widening gap between words and deeds, however, policies and strategies 
of African countries should not worsen their currently growing marginaliza-
tion. 
 
3. The benefits and costs of accession to the WTO  
 
In a working paper presented to Kiel Institute of World Economics 
(Germany), Rolf J. Langhammer and Mattias Lücke discussed the positive 
and negative impacts that accession to the WTO can have on vulnerable 
economies.  They believe that multilateral trade rules that have been included 
in the WTO Agreement (and mainly the General Agreement on Services –
GATS—and Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights –TRIPS--) “are of 
little relevance to improved export market access for vulnerable economies, 
while the implementation of the new rules involves a large administrative 
burden to them.” 22  
 
Under a section entitled “Benefits and Costs of WTO Membership for        
Vulnerable Economies”, Langhammer and Lücke briefly discuss what least 
developed countries can possibly gain from accession to the WTO and the 
costs that are likely to be encountered.  “[S]mall population, …remoteness 
from major markets” as in the case of landlocked states, “reliance on a small 
number of export goods, mostly raw materials, weak administrative           
capacities, large economic and ecological vulnerability, lack of market-
oriented institutional infrastructure, and political instability often com-
pounded by civil disorder” are identified as the common characteristics of 
most least developed countries that were candidates for WTO accession in 
the year 2000.   
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23   Ibid, 4 24 Ibid, 4-6 25   Ibid, 6-8 
In view of these characteristics, “the gains from WTO membership seem to 
be small if they are assessed only in terms of improved market access for the 
traditional exports of (least developed countries)”.  According to Langham-
mer and Lücke, ”supply bottlenecks … including inadequate transport facili-
ties (in least developed countries) seem to hamper export expansion more 
than policy-induced barriers on the demand side.”23 The common characteris-
tics of most LDCs (except the population factor) apply to Ethiopia as well.    
 
In spite of these pitfalls, Langhammer and Lücke state five good reasons24  
for least developed countries to join WTO.  First, the binding commitments 
to reform in all trade-related policies due to WTO membership will reinforce 
government efforts towards liberalization.  Second, “WTO membership, in-
cluding the process of accession, leads to sizable technical assistance in the 
form of training with respect to the legal framework of the multilateral trad-
ing system and its economic underpinnings.”  Third, the WTO system can 
help withstand “pressure from powerful import markets … (including) eco-
nomically powerful neighbors (in their roles) as transit countries and trading 
partners”.  Fourth, it encourages least developed countries to open domestic 
market even if they get market access “under special or preferential treatment 
for a certain period”, and import market opening causes a considerable fall in 
domestic price of imports.  Fifth, domestic regulations will become more 
transparent and non-discriminatory to potential foreign investors thereby   
attracting foreign direct investment.   
 
After a brief analysis, Langhammer and Lücke state four costs that LDCs 
could bear as a result of accession to WTO.  First, “sovereignty is curtailed 
and short-term maneuvering in trade-related policies is discouraged and also 
restricted.”  Secondly, there are economic “costs of employing high-skilled 
personnel for the implementation of WTO commitments and active participa-
tion of WTO negotiations.”  Third, the liberal multilateral trade regime “may 
expose companies in vulnerable economies to stronger competition from 
abroad, often from more advanced developing member states.”  And fourthly, 
reduction of import tariffs may significantly affect government revenue in 
many vulnerable economies.  “This may be less of an issue in the early stages 
of trade liberalization when non-tariff barriers are tariffed and prohibitive 
tariffs are lowered and imports increase.” But, in the medium to long run, 
“substantial reductions in average tariff rates require a broadening of govern-
ment’s tax bases.” 25 
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26  Simon F. Evenett and Carlos A. Prmo Graga, WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience,, 
Trade Note 22 (June 6, 2005) , The World Bank Group, International Trade Department 
4. Rising commitments and the need to optimize benefits   
 
In Trade Note 22 (June 6, 2005) published by the World Bank Group, an   
article entitled “WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience”26 discusses the   
economic, legal and political reasons that induce nations to join the WTO.  
Authors of the article, Evenett and Braga, discuss the reality of the prolonged 
and complex WTO accession process and raise the critical question whether 
the rising price of WTO accession is worth its impact in the development  
endeavors of least developed countries. 
 
4.1- The rationale and commitments of accession 
 
According to Evenett and Braga, the first economic rationale of WTO       
accession is the integration of the acceding state to the world economy with 
the expectation of higher exports as a result of more predictable access to 
foreign markets.  And, the second economic rationale is the use of “WTO 
membership as a seal of approval recognized by the international business 
community” thereby attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI).  More-
over, lower prices, a greater variety of imports, and improvement of impor-
tant components of the national business environment are stated as sizeable 
domestic payoffs. 
 
The paper also states the “legal advantages of accessing a rules-based system 
and of using the WTO dispute settlement process” and the political reasons 
of transition economies (i.e. economies that move towards market econo-
mies) as verification of “their commitment to joining the international com-
munity of market-based economies.” Such economies “may see WTO acces-
sion as facilitating both political and economic reform within their coun-
tries”. 
 
The article states that the procedure that an applicant for accession goes 
through is one-sided, costly, complex and lengthy.  Moreover, “the price of 
joining the WTO now includes commitments that go beyond GATT/WTO 
agreements” and this price is steadily rising with “little account of the spe-
cific circumstances of applicant countries or their needs for special and dif-
ferential treatment”.  
 
The commitments made by acceding countries involve “market access (on 
goods and services) and other commitments on rules.”  Evenett and Braga 
state that “in the areas of agricultural and non-agricultural (typically       
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manufacturing) products there is clear evidence that the price of accession –
expressed in terms of the extent of market access concessions made by      
acceding countries- is growing over time.”  
 
This holds true for services (commitments under the GATS) as well.  The 
paper contrasts the 160 services sub-sectors currently identified in the WTO 
classification list against the 20 sub-sectors that founding LDC members of 
the WTO were committed to in 1995.  “[T]the averages for founding Mem-
bers in the developing and developed categories, in turn were respectively 44 
and 108.  Countries that have acceded since 1995, in turn, have on average 
committed around 104 sub-sectors”.  
 
4.2 Towards optimizing the benefits of accession   
 
The critical question forwarded by Evenett and Braga is whether the rising 
price of WTO accession “is worth paying in terms of its developmental im-
pact.”   In case the cost of accession is worth paying, “the demands made by 
existing WTO members of acceding countries might be characterized as 
‘tough love’.” If, however the cost outweighs the benefits, “the WTO acces-
sion process may be seen as a one-sided power play whereby current WTO 
members wring commercial advantage out of weaker economic partners.” 
 
The paper reviews studies on the impact of WTO accession on national ex-
ports and imports and holds that “whether joining WTO bolsters a nation’s 
exports depends not only on the changes in market access that are supposed 
to follow from accession (in terms of greater predictability), but also on the 
steps taken by the government and firms in the applicant country”. 
 
Evenett and Braga suggest that “[as] early as possible in the WTO accession, 
process, it is desirable to identify precisely how signing binding commit-
ments at the WTO can further reform and help attain national priorities.”  
They state   Cambodia as an example for having “identified textiles, clothing, 
and tourism as sectors which could benefit from reform” and for having 
“developed negotiating priorities in its WTO accession process accordingly.”  
The paper recommends realistic expectations of what the WTO accession 
involves and advises applicants to expect that the  process of accession at 
least  takes five years or longer. 
 
In addition to the identification of national priorities, least developed coun-
tries “should at a minimum insist on technical assistance to mitigate the im-
plementation costs”.  The paper reiterates the duration, complexity, and wide 
reaching scope of the WTO accession process, and suggests that “accession 
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countries should develop a ‘road map’ that identifies the different types of 
assistance needs required at each stage of the WTO accession process in part-
nership with the financers and providers of technical assistance.”  In this con-
text the paper appreciates the diagnostic tools (that provide a comprehensive 
assessment of national needs) “associated with the Integrated Framework, 
which have been successfully applied in Cambodia, for example, and that are 
currently being used in the context of Ethiopia’s (efforts towards) accession.”   
In its concluding remarks the paper underlines the concern “that the growing 
price of WTO accession, including forcing applicants to agree on WTO+ and 
WTO-  commitments, is creating a multi-tiered world trading system in 
which recently-acceded countries have higher obligation and more limited 
‘rights’.” 
 
5. Lessons from Nepal, Cambodia and Vietnam 
 
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha (November 2001) had    
expressed its concern regarding the participation of least-developed countries 
(LDCs) in the WTO and the multilateral trading system and had declared that 
accession of LDCs into the WTO system ought to be facilitated.  And in    
December 2002, this commitment was adopted as the General Council     
Decision on Accession of Least-Developed Countries. 27 
 
Paragraph 42 of the Doha Declaration stated that “…Accession of LDCs   
remains a priority for the Membership”. The Declaration recognized the need 
“to facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs” and the     
Declaration further instructed the Secretariat to reflect the priority attached 
“to LDCs’ accessions in the annual plans for technical assistance…” 
 
According to the decision of the General Council dated 10 December 2002 
on Streamlining Accession, “WTO Members shall exercise restraint in     
seeking concessions and commitments on trade in goods and services from 
acceding LDCs, taking into account the levels of concessions and            
commitments undertaken by existing WTO LDCs' Members.” Moreover, the        
decision had entitled acceding LDCs to offer “reasonable concessions and 
commitments on trade in goods and services commensurate with their        
individual development, financial and trade needs” in accordance with 
“Article XXXVI.8 of GATT 1994, Article 15 of the Agreement on             
Agriculture, and Articles IV and XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services.”28 
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31  Ibid, 32 
 
32   Ibid 
33 AITIC Information Brief: Rethinking Ac-
cession of LDCs in the Light of General 
Council  Decision of 10 December 2002- 
December 2005 (Pg. 3) www.acici.org/aitic/
documents/IBs/download/IB7_eng.doc 
5.1- Nepal and Cambodia   
 
The Technical Note on the Accession Process29 applauds the Doha            
declaration and the Decision of the General Council:  “Currently, one third of 
all acceding governments are LDCs.  Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 42 of the 
Doha Declaration, much work has been undertaken to ‘facilitate and         
accelerate the accession negotiations with LDCs’.”30 The Technical Note 
calls for more consideration to the specific needs of acceding LDCs,         
particularly with regard to “market access (restraint from seeking conces-
sions and commitments from acceding LDCs); WTO rules (Special and     
Differential Treatment, transition periods, Plurilateral trade Agreements); 
process (streamlined accession procedures); and Technical Assistance 
(priority attention to acceding LDCs).”31 The Note cites Nepal as having 
been able to negotiate “average final tariff bound rates of 41.4 per cent for 
agricultural and 23.7 percent for non-agricultural products”. 32    
 
The Note praises the transition periods given to Nepal and Cambodia “to im-
plement various WTO Agreements, such as the Agreements on SPS, TBT, 
TUIPS and Customs Valuation.”  It also states that “special attention has 
been given to technical assistance for LDCs acceding to the WTO”, and cites 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 42 that instructs the Secretariat 
“to reflect the priority we attach to LDCs accession in the annual plans for 
technical assistance” and the emphasis given in the Guidelines for the        
importance of “targeted and coordinated technical assistance and capacity 
building”. 
 
However, there are critics that consider the onerous nature of Nepal’s and 
Cambodia’s accession to the WTO.  According to the Agency for Interna-
tional Trade and Information Cooperation (Aitic),   “An analysis of Cambo-
dia and Nepal’s terms of accession confirms the general trend in the WTO 
that countries are requested to make ever-increasing accession commitments, 
which sometimes go far beyond what is commensurate with their level of 
development.” The paper states that the transitional periods negotiated by 
Cambodia is “five years for customs valuation, four years for sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS),  three years for both technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) and TRIPS, (while) Nepal negotiated a three-year transitional period 
for customs valuation, SPS, TBT and TRIPS.” 33  
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The Agency further explained that Cambodia and Nepal “made important 
liberalization commitments on their trade in goods” and stated that these 
countries had to substantially revise their initial offers on market access in 
agriculture and industrial products. Both countries bound 100 per cent of 
their tariff lines” as indicated below: 
 
Cambodia and Nepal’s Market Access Commitments 
Source: Information Brief (IB), Aitic No.7, December 2005, p.3 (Agency for International 
Trade and Information Cooperation) Trade Profile 2005 
 
Similar criticism is leveled against the negotiations regarding Other Duties 
and Charges (ODCs), i.e. taxes levied outside the ordinary tariff schedule. 
“Nepal … committed to eliminating them over a period of between two and 
ten years.”  Likewise “Cambodia bound ODCs at zero and transformed 
ODCs levied on petrol and diesel imports into a compound tariff rate. Cam-
bodia also bound its export subsidies at zero-level, thus relinquishing its right 
to use them in the future.” 
 
Information Brief of the Agency expressed its concern in the sphere of ser-
vices.  It stated that “both countries agreed to a larger number of commit-
ments than those of the original WTO developing country members. Cambo-
dia scheduled specific commitments on more than 60 sectors and sub-
sectors” that include professional services, “telecoms (seven out of 15 sub-
sectors), distribution, financial, transport services (air transport, road and 
  Cambodia Nepal 




tariff rates 44% 27.44% 51% 39% 
Revised offer 
tariff rates 30.88% 20.71% 42% 24% 
Average rates 
(bound) 28.10% 17.70% 41.40% 23.70% 
Applied rates 
2003 19.5% 15.9% 13.5% 13.7% 
Tariff Peaks 60% 50% 200% 130% 
Minimal Rates 5% 0% 10% 0% 
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maritime), and other entertainment services” The commitments of Nepal 
“cover 11 sectors (business services, communications, construction, distribu-
tion, educational, environmental, financial, health, tourism, recreational and 
transport) and 70 sub-sectors (including some of them fully liberalized and 
others with partial commitments).” It is to be noted that both countries 
“included audiovisual services (production and distribution of motion pic-
tures and television programmes) in their List of Article II MFN Exemp-
tions.” 
 
With regard to Special and Differential Treatment, “the TRIPS-consistent 
measures already in place would not benefit from any transition period, and 
national treatment and MFN would apply from the date of accession.” Both 
countries conceded “to provide data protection, as well as protection for 
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products immediately after acces-
sion”, while on the contrary, “the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health stated that LDCs need not provide for, nor enforce, patents 
and data protection with respect to pharmaceutical products until 1 January 
2016.” The period given to Nepal and Cambodia, in exchange for these con-
cessions was very short.  Both countries should fully implement the obliga-
tions of the TRIPS Agreement (as of 1 January 2007) “whereas LDCs were 
granted under the TRIPS Agreement a transition period of a total of eleven 
years (from 1995 until 1 January 2006), with the possibility of an extension.” 
 
The Agency sums up that the guidelines embodied in the Decision of Decem-
ber 2002 do not seem to have softened the hardships of the accession process 
for LDCs. “It may be argued that Cambodia’s and Nepal’s deep and painful 
economic restructuring, and the commitments and concessions arising from 
their WTO accession process, will assist them in anchoring economic reform 
under international obligations”, but this can be achieved at a very high 
price.34 
 
Ratnakar Adhikari and  Navin Dahal35 strongly criticized the negotiation 
process that is very disadvantageous to LDCs, and they discussed the       
problems encountered by Nepal and Cambodia.   They have also forwarded 
recommendation that can36 facilitate and accelerate the foreign trade and     
developmental endeavors of Least Developed Countries. 
 
5.2- Lessons from Vietnam 
 
After eleven years of negotiations, the WTO General Council approved Viet 
Nam’s membership on 7 November 2006.  On 12 December 2006 Viet Nam 
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37 Carin Zissis, Council on Foreign Relations, October 30, 2006   
   http://www.cfr.org/publication/11846/surging_vietnamese_economy.html?breadcrumb=%
2Fissue%2F7%2Feconomic_development 
informed the WTO that it has ratified its membership agreement. It has thus 
become the WTO’s 150th member on 11 January 2007. Carin Zissis’s notes 
highlighted in the following paragraphs are indeed informative.37 
  
“More than three decades after a communist offensive reunified Vietnam, 
the party’s hold on power and civil society remains unchallenged. But 
twenty years of liberal economic reforms have brought sweeping changes 
and foreign investment to a nation characterized by increasing industrializa-
tion and a reduction in poverty. … Despite the Communist Party of Viet-
nam’s continued grip over the country’s politics, central planning has given 
way to a market-based economic system and a marked decrease in the num-
ber of state-owned enterprises.”  
 
Vietnam has a population of 84 million and it has a booming economy. As a 
WTO member, “it will benefit from elimination of quotas limiting textile ex-
ports to the United States and Europe.”  The major factors behind its eco-
nomic boom are its shift from agriculture to manufacturing, Foreign Direct 
Investment and remittances from about 3 million Vietnamese living abroad.  
  
“Agriculture’s role in the economic output of an increasingly industrialized 
Vietnam decreased from 25 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2005. But ex-
ports of coffee, tea, and pepper have soared in recent years. And Vietnam-
ese fish exports grew by 12 percent in the past year, despite antidumping 
actions taken by the U.S. and Japanese fishing industries. Aside from mak-
ing shoes and apparel, Vietnamese manufacturing of electronic goods is on 
the rise because of large investments from companies such as Intel and 
Canon, the latter of which built the world’s largest laser printer factory in 
northern Vietnam. …” 
 
In the realm of investment, the Vietnamese government “has eased limits on 
foreign ownership of businesses,” and cheap land and low wages in Vietnam 
“attract foreign investors. As Foreign Domestic Investment rises—it in-
creased by 41 percent to $5.8 billion in 2005—the number of state-owned 
enterprises shrinks, down from 5,600 in 2001 to 3,200 in 2005.” 
 
6. Ethiopia’s status in the accession process 
 
6.1- Procedures and requirements towards WTO membership 
 
Article XII of the WTO Agreement provides that, “Any state or customs    
territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible 
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38 Accession to the WTO, Procedures of Negotiations under Article XII (Note by the Secretariat, 
24 March 1995) WT/ACC/1 
to accede to the WTO on terms agreed between it and WTO Members”.  The 
phrase that reads “on terms agreed between it and the WTO” has left the door 
wide open for the ever increasing list of commitments and negotiations      
towards eligibility to accession.   
 
According to Paragraph 3 of the Note by the WTO Secretariat on March 
1995: 
 
The procedures for accession to the WTO under Article XII require the ex-
amination of the  foreign trade régime of the acceding State or     separate 
customs territory;  the negotiation and establishment of a schedule of con-
cessions and commitments to GATT 1994 and a schedule of specific com-
mitments to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for such 
State or separate customs territory; agreement on the Report of the working 
party;  and agreement on a Decision and a Protocol setting out the terms of 
Accession. 38 
 
Unlike the predictable terms and the automatic process of membership upon 
accession to other international institutions, accession to the WTO involves a 
series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations and decisions of the Working 
Party by consensus. The following summarizes the process: 
 
“The WTO accession process can be divided into three phases. In the first 
stage, a country wishing to become a member of the WTO submits an ap-
plication to the General Council of the WTO. The General Council estab-
lishes a Working Party of all interested WTO members. The applicant then 
submits to the Working Party a detailed memorandum on its foreign trade 
regime, describing, among other things, its economy, economic policies, 
domestic and international trade regulations, and intellectual property poli-
cies. In the next stage the Working Party members submit written questions 
to the applicant to clarify aspects of its foreign trade regime. After all     
necessary background information has been acquired; the Working Party 
begins meetings to focus on issues of discrepancy between the applicant’s 
international and domestic trade policies and laws and WTO rules and 
laws. The final stage of the accession process consists of series of bilateral 
negotiations between the applicant and WTO members. When the bilateral 
talks conclude, the Working Party sends an accession package, which in-
cludes a summary of all Working Party meetings and the Protocol of Ac-
cession to the General Council or the Ministerial Conference. Once the 
General Council or the Ministerial Council approves of the terms of acces-
sion, the applicant must accept the protocol of accession. Thirty days after 
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the applicant accepts the protocol of accession it becomes an official mem-
ber of the WTO. “39     
 
6.2- The current status of Ethiopia’s request 
 
The Technical Note on the Accession Process 40 issued by the WTO Secre-
tariat (28 November 2005), explains the various steps of the accession proc-
ess.  The shortest accession process stated in the document is 2 years and 10 
months (Kyrgyz Republic) while the longest was China’s that took 15 years 
and 5 months. The period that took Nepal and Cambodia to complete the 
process was 14 years & 11 months and 9 years & 10 months respectively. 
   
According to the Summary Table of Ongoing Accessions to the WTO 
(updated in January 2007),41 there are 29 pending requests including Algeria, 
Ethiopia, Libya and the Sudan.  Ethiopia acquired an observer status in 1997 
for a period of five years until 2003. The request of Ethiopia for accession 
was circulated in 13 January 2003.  Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Foreign 
Trade Regime (MFTR) has been circulated in January 2007.   There are yet 
upcoming phases42 of questions and replies, meetings of the Working Party, 
series of documentations, market access negotiations, factual summary and 
Working Party Report before the completion of the accession process.  
 
7. The Path Ahead 
 
Enhancing the Role of Trade and Development is among the commitments 
embodied in Ethiopia’s Status Report on the Brussels Programme of Action 
(BPoA) for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) prepared by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development in January 2006.   
 
The Status Report states that Ethiopia has initiated the process of its acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO) which, according to the Report 
“facilitates the integration of the Ethiopian economy with the international 
trading system through developing skills in bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations.”  The report also raises the efforts “that are being strengthened 
to gain from African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Everything But 
Arms (EBA) initiatives.” The Report further expresses the Government’s 
39 Ratnakar Adhikari and Navin Dahal, 
LDCs’ Accession to the WTO: Learning 
from the Cases of Nepal, Cambodia and 
Vanuatu, South Asia Watch on Trade, Eco-
nomics and Environment (SAWTEE), Kath-
mandu, Nepal http://www.un-ngls.org/
SAWTEE.doc 
40 Technical Note on the Accession Process, 
Note by the WTO Secretariat, 28 November 
2005 (WT/ACC/10/Rev 3) 
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plans to implement the findings of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 
(DTIS), which include “recommendations in the areas of diversification, re-
moval of trade constraints, and strengthening the capacity of trade support 
organizations.”43  
 
7.1- Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade Related Technical  Assistance 
 
Accession to the WTO and the subsequent integration into the multilateral 
trading system is not an easy process. Apparently, it entails costs that require 
proactive measures and precautions so that short-term problems can be mini-
mized and the accession can be beneficial with regard to its medium and long
-term effects.  One of the good practices in this regard is the Integrated 
Framework for trade-related assistance to least-developed countries (IF) that 
was launched in 1997.   
 
“The IF is a partnership between the IF core multilateral agencies (IMF, 
ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, the World Bank and WTO), other agencies, bilat-
eral donors and the LDCs themselves to ensure that LDCs’ national trade 
policies are integrated into their respective development strategies.  The IF 
facilitates the coordinated response provided by the various agencies and 
development partners, each in their own area of expertise, to the trade-
related assistance and capacity-building needs identified by each of the 
LDCs.  It has been recognized that there could be a strong link between the 
IF and accession, as the IF process identifies the impediments to effective 
integration into the multilateral trading system and proposes follow-up    
action to address the specific country’s accession needs.  This has been the 
case of Cambodia and Nepal where the IF has contributed positively to the 
accession process.  As for the LDCs currently engaged in the WTO         
accession process, Ethiopia and Yemen have already benefited from the IF 
process while Lao PDR and Sao Tome and Principe are currently in various 
stages of the IF process”. 44 
 
Ethiopia’s Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade-related Technical Assistance 
pursues the action plan stated under the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 
(DTIS) that was issued in December 2004.  “The DTIS identifies key issues 
related to Ethiopia’s integration into the multilateral trade system and the 
global economy.”  Ethiopia’s primary objective upon trade integration into 
the global economy “is to reap the benefits of transforming its subsistence 
agricultural economy into a modern commercial and industrial economy.” 
110  MIZAN LAW REVIEW     Vol. 1 No.1, June 2007 
 
45 Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade-related Technical Assistance, Diagnostic Trade Inte-
gration Study (DTIS), December 2004, Page 5  
46 Ibid, 6-7  
and “greater participation in world trade could provide additional              
opportunities to address the challenging issues of economic growth and     
poverty reduction, provided that it is complemented and supported by       
poverty-alleviation interventions.”  
 
The DTIS “looks at both supply and demand factors that influence the       
present level of trade with the rest of the world and identifies the key        
constraints to the country’s integration into the multilateral trade system and 
into the global economy.”  The DTIS further “proposes a program of techni-
cal assistance needed to remove these constraints in order to enhance Ethio-
pia’s participation in world trade by improving its competitiveness to derive 
larger benefits from trade”45 
 
The Validation Workshop hosted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 
November 10-11 2003 “identified issues and constraints and proposed rec-
ommendations to address them under each thematic area with the following 
specific objectives: 
a) Creating a conducive incentive structure for trade 
b) Improving market access for Ethiopia’s exports 
c) Poverty reduction through trade, particularly export growth  
d) Increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
e) Creating a conducive legal and regulatory framework for trade and 
investment 
f) Improving trade facilitation services and thus removing ‘at the bor-
der’ constraints 
g) Building the capacity of trade support institutions 
h) Increasing agricultural productivity and diversifying and enhancing 
the volume of exports from such sub-sectors as horticulture, live-
stock, and meat, sugar, leather and textiles as well as enhancing the 
performance of the tourism sector”.46 
 
The National Technical Committee that oversees technical issues of the IF/
DTIS process has identified thematic areas and the tasks therein along with 
the corresponding agencies that are in charge of implementation. Its recom-
mendations include priorities under: 
a) trade reform and incentive structure 
b) market access – ‘beyond the border issues’ 
c) trade and poverty 
d) foreign direct investment and trade 
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e) legal and regulatory structure and trade and investment 
f) trade facilitation 
g) institutions and institutional support 
h) agriculture and trade 
i) livestock and meat 
j) manufacturing sector, and  
k) tourism. 
 
Priorities under Market Access aim at enhancing the “negotiating capacity of 
institutions to overcome tariff-and non-tariff barriers imposed in both devel-
oping and developed countries on Ethiopian export bundle”, and at measures 
towards the diversification of Ethiopia’s export bundle, “which is relatively 
small and concentrated to mainly agricultural products and which also faces 
negative growth in world markets, through bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments such as COMESA and the implementation of EBA ….” 47 
 
The priorities under Foreign Direct Investment and Trade have (inter alia) 
the objective of ensuring “that the legal and regulatory framework is condu-
cive to attract Foreign Direct Investment and strengthen the institutional ca-
pacity (and performance) of the Ethiopian Investment Commission …”   The 
recommended priorities under this thematic area include considering “fast 
accession to WTO to enhance credibility and overcome perceptions of high 
risk of policy reversals and uncertainty” and “(reviewing) the present land 
lease system to make it conducive to FDI by making it more affordable, ac-
cessible and by enhancing tenure security.” 48 
 
7.2- Ethiopia’s Accession Roadmap 
 
Ethiopia’s Accession Draft Roadmap indicates the list of activities, expected 
support from donors and accomplishments/ descriptions with regard to the 
work done, ongoing activities, delays and risk factors.  The activities have 
been classified into phases. The submission of Memorandum of Foreign 
Trade Regime (MFTR) to the WTO Secretariat with all relevant legislation 
was a major activity planned for the last quarter of 2006.49 The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry has been able to accomplish this task and Ethiopia has 
submitted its MFTR to WTO in January 2007. 
 
Tasks that have been planned for 2007 involve certain assumptions and risks 
that are beyond the control of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  For in-
47 Ibid, 11  
48 Ibid, 12  
49 Ethiopia’s Accession Draft Roadmap, 11 
Oct. 2006 (4th Quarter 2006, Activity No. 1) 
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stance, activities such as participation in first Working Party meeting, con-
ducting multilateral discussion and bilateral negotiations, and response to 
questions from the working party members require not only the due prepara-
tion on the part of Ethiopia, but also the smooth progress of the accession 
process at WTO where the process usually takes beyond anticipated sched-
ules.  In view of such factors that may prolong the pace of these phases, 
Ethiopia's formal accession to WTO may go beyond the year anticipated in 
the revised roadmap, i.e: 2010/2011. 
 
7.3- Costs of membership to GATT, GATS and TRIPS 
 
a) Trade in Goods 
 
The effect of Ethiopia’s WTO accession may not be as costly as it seems 
with regard to trade in goods.  Tariff rates are indeed low, and yet, WTO 
members may still demand for lower tariffs than would have been the case 
had our tariffs been higher. Tariff rates lowered under unilateral trade       
liberalization can be raised upon the economic realities and changing needs.   
Bound rates under multilateral trade liberalization, however, are inflexible, 
and in effect Ethiopia’s negotiating stance with regard to agricultural and   
industrial products needs precaution so that we can strike a balance between 
attracting WTO members and avoiding bottlenecks.  
 
Ethiopia’s macroeconomic indicators clearly show a very wide gap between 
export and import of goods.  In the short run, lower tariffs would clearly 
mean rise in imports because significant rise in exports seems to require 
some time in view of our apparent inability to utilize very advantageous 
schemes such as AGOA and EBA.   Reduced revenue as a result of lower 
tariffs may in the short-run be partially compensated by the aggregate tariff 
revenue from increased volume of imports. However, inability to invigorate 
economic development and enhance exports would ultimately affect the tax 
base and internal tax revenue.   
 
As Ethiopia’s accession process is underway, it is thus necessary to optimize 
special preferential opportunities (under AGOA and EBA), strengthen the 
unilateral liberalization process, and enhance Ethiopia’s regional trade       
performance in COMESA.  Such concerted efforts will apparently enhance 
the entrepreneurial culture and productivity of all sectors engaged in the    
production, transportation, trade and export of industrial and agricultural 
products.  
 
The transition can indeed be difficult.  Even the booming Chinese economy 
had encountered negative effects of WTO accession as a price to the benefits 
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thereof.  China has conceded to substantial commitments for WTO entry, 
“and the liberalization of international trade will undoubtedly cause negative 
effects for China's relevant industries. Such effects may include decreased 
earnings, plant closings, higher skill levels for workers, and layoffs.” 50   
 
b) Trade in Services 
 
The difficult part of the negotiation process in Ethiopia’s accession can be in 
the realm of trade in services, and in particular, the pressure on the part of 
negotiating WTO members for liberalization of sectors such as banking,    
insurance and telecommunications.  “The trend towards fuller participation 
by a large number of developing countries in the multilateral trading system 
has gained further momentum in the extended negotiations on financial ser-
vices and basic telecommunications.” 51 
 
 Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) market access 
and national treatment are granted “if and to the extent pertinent specific 
commitments have been entered into by members: Without such commit-
ment, a member is free to not grant foreign services (and service providers), 
the treatment enjoyed by their domestic counterparts. …”52 However, acced-
ing countries are at a disadvantage because in big markets such as Ethiopia 
negotiating WTO members will apparently incline towards obtaining signifi-
cant specific commitments in financial services, telecommunications and 
similar vital sectors.   
 
c) Trade in Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
 
Much criticism has been forwarded in the realm of Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights.  Professor Joseph Straus cites the comment made by Nobel 
Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz against the structure of intellectual property 
rights that has become so extreme that “it is … especially harmful to devel-
oping countries… Institutional mechanisms should be established ‘so that we 
can go back and recognize the need for developing countries, for instance, to 
have some technology transfer.” 53    Professor Straus also underlines his con-
50 Heng Wang, Chinese Views on Modern 
Marco Polos: New Foreign Trade Amend-
ments after WTO Accession, 39 Cornell 
International Law Journal 329 (Spring, 
2006) 349 
 
51 Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The 
UNESCO Diversity Convention and Inter-
national Trade Law’  Journal of Interna-
tional Economic Law (September, 2006), 
page 52 
52  Ibid  
53 Joseph Straus, The Impact of the New 
World Order on Economic Development: 
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights 
System, .6 John Marshall Review of Intellec-
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369 
cern about the prevention of “multinational biotechnology firms from ex-
ploiting developing countries.”54      
 
The criticism against multilateral trade liberalization with regard to Intellec-
tual Property Rights (IPRs) is shared by many scholars.  Yet, “[d]eveloping 
countries that initially opposed the inclusion of an agreement augmenting 
protection of IPRs in the WTO ultimately accepted it”. They had probably 
expected “to gain important concessions from developed countries on agri-
cultural export issues. Those countries, however, may lose more by protect-
ing IPRs than they gain from the developed countries' concessions.”  Devel-
oping countries disfavor TRIPS because “paying increased royalties for pro-
tected works would create significant cash outflows.”   To developing coun-
tries, technology transfer is crucial to development.  Developed countries, on 
the contrary, view it as piracy and “robbery of property (that the author or 
patent owner) has acquired through … expenditure of effort.” 55    
 
Under Ethiopia’s realities, we are yet unable to imitate the technology that 
developed countries strive to protect through the TRIPS Agreement.  Thus in 
the short-run we don’t seem to have much at stake in this regard.  However, 
accession to TRIPS may, for example, ultimately entail stiff copyright com-
mitments to the extent of hindering schools and colleges from their current 
practice of photocopying published (expensive) materials for classes. 
 
Ethiopia is thus expected to insist on the longest transition period possible 
after accession.  “The November 2005 WTO decision to extend the obliga-
tion of the least-developed countries to assume TRIPS obligations (until July 
2013) was clearly a decision that bowed to the inevitable” because many 
LDCs were unable to assume “their TRIPS obligations as scheduled on Janu-
ary 1, 2006. The 2005 TRIPS extension for LDCs is evidence of a fundamen-




As one of the external assessors of this article correctly remarked, “the issue 
of multilateral trade liberalization under the auspices of WTO is a very broad 
issue that can’t  adequately be addressed in a paper of this nature.” The au-
thor of this article is also grateful to the remarks made by the assessor that 
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“accession to the WTO is, by its nature, a one-way process (and not multilat-
eral trade liberalization) in which those that are already members of the Or-
ganization exercise their privileged positions to extract as much concessions 
as they possibly could from the candidate countries.”  Indeed, this is what 
renders the costs and benefits of WTO accession a bittersweet paradox.  On 
the one hand it is expected to be a multilateral trading system that gives due 
attention to the needs and aspirations of developing countries, and on the 
contrary accession (unlike membership to other international organizations) 
is a one-way process.   
 
Setting aside such gaps between the promises laid down in the preamble of 
the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement and the actual reality, the concept of 
‘multilateral trade liberalization under the WTO system’  involves three ele-
ments, namely: trade (i.e. exchange of goods and services for consideration), 
multilateral (i.e. inter-state commerce involving goods, services and incorpo-
real products of the mind from WTO Member States/customs territories), and 
liberalization (i.e. absence of  restrictions, significant reduction of tariffs and 
avoidance of non-tariff barriers).   
 
Exchange apparently presupposes the production and accessibility of goods, 
services and incorporeal products of the mind.  And, it is what Ethiopia can 
produce and export to foreign markets with due efficiency, quality and     
competitive price that determine the scope of its multilateral trade.   
 
Ethiopia’s foreign trade profile (September 2006) 57 is a point of much      
concern.  In merchandise trade, Ethiopia’s exports were worth USD 883    
Million, and in terms of magnitude they were worth 21.4 percent of our     
imports (which were USD 4,127 Million).  87.4 % of our exports were      
agricultural products and 11.8% manufactures.  And with regard to imports, 
manufactures constituted 64.1%, agricultural products 22.2 %, and fuels and 
mining products 13.4% of Ethiopia’s aggregate imports.  In the domain of 
commercial services, exports were worth USD 802 Million, while imports 
were valued at USD 1,177 Million.  The outcome of WTO accession (and 
membership to GATT, GATS, TRIPS, etc…) thus depends on the extent to 
which Ethiopia can addresses the factors that would enable it to be not only a 
consumer but also a competitive producer and exporter to the international 
market.   
 
The Validation Workshop hosted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(Nov. 10-11) has duly identified the need for increasing agricultural          
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productivity, diversifying and enhancing the volume of exports and the need 
for enhancing the performance of the tourism sector.  This list was not a 
mental fiction of policy makers or academics, but is a pragmatic                
recommendation of the stakeholders themselves including the producers. 
 
We are used to gaps between words and deeds.  Cases in point are piles of 
projects, decisions and researches that are shelved until they are outdated.  
However, we don’t seem to have the time and the option to let the Validation 
Workshop recommendations hibernate towards oblivion, because Ethiopia is 
just a few steps away from its accession to the WTO, an event that will      
expose us to the real world of productivity and competition. 
 
We have much to learn from the problems and achievements of the LDCs 
(Nepal, Cambodia and Vietnam) that have newly acceded to the WTO.  The 
lessons we can learn from these countries and the booming economies of 
China and India are numerous.  They include: due attention to tourism,     
strategic shift from agriculture to manufacturing, focus to information and 
communications technology, and transformation of oxen-driven subsistence 
agriculture towards commercial farming. 
 
Increasing agricultural productivity will remain a dream as long as we stay 
glued to the oxen-plough agriculture, and unless we put an end to the slicing 
up plots of land corresponding to the population boom in Ethiopia. The     
possibility of reviewing the land lease policy (supra, Section 7.1, last      
paragraph) has been stated among priorities towards attracting Foreign Direct              
Investment.  The question is whether this intention can become a reality, and 
if so when and how? 
 
The shift to manufacture, ICT and tourism and the simultaneous expansion of 
commercial (in lieu of the current subsistence) agriculture in the bid to      
enhance the supply side of Ethiopia’s foreign trade inevitably require revisit-
ing our rural land policy.  That doesn’t, however, mean that rural land should 
be considered ‘laissez faire’ like any other commodity, because it might 
bring about widespread dislocation and speculative chaos.  Yet, the question 
whether we can devise some legal mechanism towards securing a  safe      
percentage of the equity share of farmers in the plots of land that they possess 
while allowing them to enter into shareholding arrangements with            
commercial farming investors is an angle that can be examined.   
 
* 
This article did not focus on the accession negotiation process and issues re-
lated to the extent of tariff reduction and service liberalization.  Nor did it 
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purport to address the issue whether WTO accession facilitates Ethiopia’s 
economic development.  The theme of  this article is rather a comparative 
overview of the short-term setbacks vis à vis the eventual advantages that 
Ethiopia can obtain if the supply side (of goods and services) is nurtured and 
enhanced during the accession process and thereafter.  Provided that we man-
age to do significant progress in this regard, the reciprocal causal effects can 
enable the results of accession, i.e. credibility and predictability of conducive 
policies to accelerate Foreign Direct Investment and in effect facilitate our 
development endeavours. 
  
The preceding sections of this paper have inter alia highlighted various     
perspectives of optimism and skepticism with regard to the path and impact 
of multilateral trade liberalization in the Ethiopian context.  The lofty         
objectives enshrined in the preamble of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement are 
indeed encouraging while facts on the ground speak otherwise. David       
Ricardo’s doctrine creates in us the optimism of comparative advantage in 
organic coffee, flower production, etc., while on the contrary, the level and 
instability of market prices for agricultural products, lack of control of LDCs 
over the market of primary products, the agricultural subsidies of the         
developed countries, the alleged environmental impact of flower production, 
the steadily increasing usage of fertilizers in lieu of organic production etc… 
dampen our feelings of optimism.  
 
The tone of some of the criticisms leveled against the WTO multilateral   
trading system might indeed seem sharp.  Criticisms from Global Exchange 
and Udombana are cases in point.  Yet, Udombana, for example, is not 
against multilateral trade liberalization as such.  In effect, the criticisms have 
not been forwarded from a nihilist perspective, but rather from a constructive 
standpoint with a view to stating the economic injustice that is manifest in 
the actual modus operandi of the WTO multilateral trading system.   The 
imaginative Grotian conception of ‘war and trade’ further deepens our query 
whether the WTO multilateral trading system is a new forum of clashing vital 
interests with the subtlety and finesse of the 21st Century.  Analogous to or-
ganic life itself, only the fittest economies seem to survive and develop. 
 
The list of costs and benefits of trade liberalization under the WTO          
multilateral trading system has further been articulated by Langhammer and 
Lücke who meanwhile discussed the good reasons for LDCs to join the 
WTO multilateral trading system. The economic, legal and political          
advantages of accession to the WTO have also been discussed by various 
writers, and further substantiated by the objectives of Ethiopia’s request for 
accession as articulated in official documents such as Ethiopia’s Status     
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Report on the Brussels Programme of Action (BPOA) and the Integrated 
Framework (IF) for Trade Related Technical Assistance. 
 
In light of the literature highlighted in this paper, the cost-benefit balance 
sheet seems to indicate short-term difficulties that can lead to eventual gains 
from multilateral trade liberalization. In a way, we don’t seem to have a 
choice, because, unlike Ethiopia’s legendary epoch of Prester John, our 
mountains can no more be ‘safe havens’ from regional integration, globaliza-
tion and the multilateral trading system.    
 
The path ahead is indeed difficult.  The accession process might also take 
longer than predicted in Ethiopia’s accession roadmap.  Nevertheless, the 
years of processing Ethiopia’s accession can be used as the timeframe for 
putting our house in order so that we can be prepared for the competence   
towards survival and development. 
